International cooperation is more like a tango than a shuffle; its complexities make it difficult to follow. One perspective, rational choice/game theory, has offered a powerful simplifying guide: the "cooperation two-step." One step involves the formation of preferences of actors, the second, interaction among actors that leads to an outcome. Although this framework has offered many insights and shaped much of the study of cooperation, its application has been prone to two types of problems. First, in recent years, the dominant approach to cooperation has neglected preference formation (Jervis 1988) and focused on the interaction of actors attempting to maximize exogenously given preferences. Understanding where preferences come from and how and when they change has received less attention. Second, because the two-step framework is rooted in a rational choice tradition, analysts of cooperation have tended to pay less attention to its cultural determinants. Yet, what is clear is that cultural accounts and the rationalist two-step need not be mutually exclusive, as suggested in different ways by Johnson (1993) and Greif (1994) . The implicit claim here is that cultural influence is important and can be usefully studied via traditional social science methodology. (There are, of course, a variety of other insightful ways to think about cultural phenomena.) This paper highlights both preferences and culture as critical for understanding international cooperation. I offer a domestic-level cultural explanation of preferences that contrasts to the common view that state desires are functionally determined or definitively constrained by the international system. Specifically, I argue that the organizational cultures of government bureaucracies produce information, plans, and capabilities which can constitute state preferences in ways that need not efficiently correspond to international circumstances. Furthermore, I illustrate how preference dynamics, in addition to interaction, can be central to variations in international conflict and cooperation. I
THE COOPERATION TWO-STEP
The implicit conceptualization of cooperation as a twostep process is widespread (for example, Moravcsik 1992; Morrow 1988; Snidal 1986).2 As Gordon Tullock (1962) argued years ago, this model suggests that both a science of preferences and a science of interaction are necessary for explaining behavior. Yet, most recent work on cooperation has emphasized interaction considerations. Studies have focused on the number of players, 2 Another common formulation distinguishes between preferences and "constraints," that is circumstances (see, for example, Frieden 1995, Levy 1990 ). The latter is similar to what I call below strategic interaction or circumstances thereof. the discount rate, and a variety of transactions concerns (such as signalling, information, commitment, monitoring, and sanctioning).3 This focus follows the classic economic/game theory model that views preferences as exogenous; they are taken as given, and the analysis begins at that point. Preferences, of course, are still a necessary analytical foundation in that they produce the pay-off matrix that decides what game is being played and whether actors' interests are compatible (Oye 1986 ), but their origins and evolution are generally left unexplored.4 Thus, the model implicitly pushes preferences to the background by focusing on the second step of interaction while assuming the first. As Stigler (1977) and Becker (1976, 5) have emphasized, this is often an intentional analytic move to avoid the ad hoc attribution of anomalies, changes in behavior, and so forth, to shifting preferences. But in the study of international cooperation, a bias in the opposite direction is apparent: Variations in cooperation are inevitably seen as a product of changing strategic circumstances. What is also needed is an appreciation for and explanation of preferences. 5 The problems that can arise in neglecting preference formation are evident in the escalation and restraint of World War II. An explanation that focuses exclusively on interaction while assuming preferences would lead to false conclusions about what mattered in producing the different results in submarine, aerial, and chemical warfare. Both interaction and preferences affected outcomes, but to understand the variation in cooperation, preference dynamics provide crucial leverage. This is so because the most prominent interaction elements of state relations-for example, the number of players, the "shadow of the future," and the ability to make commitments and signal-were similar across the three types of warfare, but the degree of cooperation differed. Yet, the preferences of states, that is, the relative desirability of different outcomes linked to the use (and restraint) of 3 For example, Schelling (1960) sees actors' ability to make credible commitments with one another as central to cooperation. Axelrod (1984) features the shadow of the future or discount rate. Oye (1986) adds to this the number of players, and Martin (1992) singles out the institutional context of bargaining. Rarely does preference formation receive central analytic attention. 4 There are, of course, exceptions; see, for example, Adler 1992, Snyder 1991, Van Evera 1986. 5 Some might argue that it makes sense to assume fixed preferences because some state interests are stable over long periods or are relatively straightforward. Examples of enduring state interests are survival, wealth, and power. But the problem is that these may not be a good guide to desires on specific issues. Many situations are complex, and what can be assumed about preferences is not clear. Consider the mandate of one of the most fundamental goals attributed to states, survival. Political regimes are eliminated without having exhausted their military potential, which illustrates that even so basic an interest as survival need not indicate the preferences a state will have in a particular circumstance, when trade-offs between the desire to protect the population and maintain political autonomy are often considered. In World War II, states certainly maintained interests in survival and security, but these did not translate into consistent preferences on cooperation, as will be seen below.
force, varied.6 On the brink of conflict leaders agreed in each of the three areas that cooperation was desirable. During the war, however, states explicitly weighed the desirability of such different outcomes as mutual restraint, one's own unilateral escalation, the opponent's unilateral escalation, and mutual escalation. In a dynamic sense, states generally viewed these as likely to stabilize in one of two outcomes-mutual restraint or mutual escalation.7 Thus, a key question is why preferences changed, favoring escalation, or persisted, supporting restraint.
In highlighting preferences, I do not mean to overlook the central insight of the cooperation two-step: Cooperation involves both preference formation and interaction. There was a critical interaction component to cooperation in World War II, because in almost every instance one state's continuing restraint was contingent on the other side's behavior. Nations were not entirely immune to reciprocity. When one side escalated, the other usually followed suit. This basic interactive component of restraint is not captured by an exclusive focus on preferences. But reciprocity was also largely consistent across the three means of warfare, while outcomes varied. Thus, we must turn to preference formation to understand the differences in cooperation in stigmatized warfare in World War II.
THE SOURCES OF STATE PREFERENCES: TWO APPROACHES
In the study of international cooperation, Tullock's "science" of preferences is relatively underdeveloped, particularly involving serious threats to state security.8 If preference formation is considered in such high-threat environments, it is typically seen as a function of the international system.9 In comparison, factors internal to states are considered less relevant. When a nation's 6 There is a subtle analytical difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over strategy (Powell 1994, 318) . The former refers to the relative desirability to an actor of alternative consequences from a situation, whereas the latter concerns the desirability to an actor of alternative strategies in light of preferences over outcomes and understandings of the other player. The difference is relevant because preferences over outcomes are typically not incorporated into strategic interaction analysis, whereas preferences over strategies can be. In World War II, cooperation (restraint) was both a desired outcome and at times a strategy in the larger "game" of war. 7 As states recognized at the time (partially due to the norms involved, any escalation in these three forms of warfare would be met with retaliatory escalation. Therefore, since first-use advantages were generally not considered overly significant, it was understood that any unilateral use would quickly result in mutual escalation, and that was the outcome to be evaluated. 8 
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existence is at stake, interest group politics, class disputes, and bureaucratic battles are expected to be put on hold as countries unite to protect their well-being. Deviations from the national interest produced by organizations or other such forces will be corrected by the intervention of state leaders who pay more attention to security strategy due to the unavoidable external challenge. The central theme is that states inevitably will behave more like unitary actors responding to international circumstances in an effort to maximize relative gains (Grieco 1990 This article explores two approaches to explaining preferences on the use of force in World War II. The first, and the one I argue is most persuasive, is organizational culture, a perspective that has received little attention in international relations. The second is based on the prevalent "realist" understanding of state aims and behavior in security affairs.10 These two are useful for comparison because they represent different analytical foci, have direct application to the issue at hand, and often provide opposite predictions.
Organizational Culture
The organizational culture approach asserts that the beliefs and customs embedded in national bureaucracies can determine national aims. Military organizational cultures deserve attention in understanding restraint in war because of the central role the armed forces play in national decisions on the use of force. This cultural view of preference formation emphasizes ideational more than material forces and the internal, rather than external, setting. In the last decade, culture has emerged as a central concept in organizational research, primarily in the field of business management. Analysts dissatisfied with formal structural analysis (which posits that similarly organized businesses will behave similarly) turned to the concept of organizational culture, defined 10 Given the historical focus on stigmatized weapons, a third proposition that might be considered is the role of norms and international institutions related to the legitimacy of different types of warfare. Due to space, this is not considered here. For detailed consideration of this proposition, see Legro (1995a Legro ( , 1995b Culture and Organizational Priorities. Organizational culture can shape organizational priorities and behavior in ways that contradict the expectations of traditional noncultural organizational perspectives based on (1) formal structure or (2) functional purpose. Let me address, first, the difference between a cultural view and one based on structure and, second, differences between cultural and functional perspectives.
One influential view of organizations is based on structure. The assumption of structural organization theory is that similar units within the context of similar structures should exhibit similar behavior. In the literature on militaries and the use of force, the theory predicts that militaries, as similar organizations seeking to maximize autonomy and size and reduce uncertainty, will display common characteristics; they will prefer offensive strategies and resist civilian intervention (Allison 1971; Posen 1984 Posen , 1991 Sigal 1988; Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984 ).12 Escalation is expected because restraint conflicts with the very nature of autonomyseeking, offense-oriented, war-winning military organizations. While research has indicated that militaries do not always desire war, after the decision for war has been made, professional soldiers value operational autonomy. Once a war is under way, militaries are inclined to use all means at their disposal. Gradualism and restraint can cost lives and are inconsistent with such hallowed principles as concentration of force and the goal of total victory (Betts 1977) . The proposition which follows from this logic is that militaries are likely to foster escalation in any usable means of warfare. From a structural organizational perspective, there is little reason to expect any dampening effect on escalation due to organizational influence. Restraint is an anomaly.13 But World War II and other conflicts belie this expectation; restraint-aided by the patronage of military organiza- 11 For an overview see Johnston (1995a). Organizational culture, or related concepts, also has been used in the literature on bureaucracy. For example, see Halperin (1974) on "essence," Rhodes (1994) on "ideas," and Wilson (1989) . 12 For an excellent analysis on the way organizational tendencies need not lead to offensive doctrines due to cultural influence, see Kier (n.d.). 13 Van Evera (1984, chapter 7) presents a detailed case on how the organizational dynamics of militaries favor escalation. Attesting to this expectation are the discussion and examples on organization theory given in Posen (1991, 16-19 (Wilson 1989 ). This uncertainty adds to the likelihood that these organizations will focus their efforts around modes or methods of output rather than actual goals. The methods over time take on a symbolic value of their own that may endure even when the demands of efficiency suggest the need for change. Individuals become socialized into, and acquire material interests (such as career advancement) in, certain modes of "doing business." In militaries these modes are styles of fighting war. In effect, collective beliefs about means become the end. And this orientation around beliefs about means leads to an insensitivity to functional adaptation to the environment.
If cultures do not derive from function or environmental pressures, where do they come from and how do they change? While these are large questions that generally lie outside the scope of this study, they deserve attention because of the implication that culture is spurious to some other "cause." My work, however, indicates that organizational culture is not the product of some monocausal force but instead is shaped by many factors, including technology, domestic and international environments, individuals, and accident. Furthermore, these components may themselves interact, allowing for a plethora of aggregate possibilities. The analytical value of focusing on culture is that it can be an autonomous force not easily reducible to the many factors constituting it. To draw an analogy, if we are interested in the effect of a hurricane, we need not always be concerned with the complex atmospheric conditions that give rise to it. The hurricane itself stands out as an identifiable, potent phenomenon that becomes greater than the sum of its parts.
What this study does have to do, however, is demonstrate that culture is not simply spurious to environmental factors such as those emphasized by the alternative explanation of preferences-realism-discussed below. The bulk of my research indicates that culture is often resilient to external pressures to change, that is, organizational cultures do not functionally adapt, even when the costs and benefits suggest it would make sense to do so. My point is not that militaries never think about results or what the enemy might do; rather, specific organizational orientations shape the valuation of both other actors and potential outcomes to such a degree (and often in conflict with "objective" external circumstances) that it is useful to think of this as an internal cultural occurrence.
What I am arguing here is a tendency, not an absolute. Militaries do adapt, adjust, and even "learn" (e.g., see Rosen 1991; Zisk 1993) . This is especially true in stark cases of rapid changes (i.e., "shocks") that dramatically disconfirm the plausibility of existing cultural orientation (see the case of U.S. submarine policy below). Nonetheless, military cultures seem relatively durable, and adaptation is often episodic. There is enough evidence from World War II and other periods in history that militaries do not consistently "learn" (even after losing "battle after battle," such as the United States in Vietnam) to prevent explaining behavior by focusing on adaptation to objective circumstances (Keegan 1993). Thus, despite the possibility of cultural change and the associated difficulties with explaining it, the basic contention of the organizational culture approach is that culture often persists even when in conflict with environmental circumstances.
Organizational Salience and State Preferences. The remaining issue to be explained is how organizational propensity shapes state desires. This has been a weak point in traditional organization theory applied to foreign policy (Art 1973; Krasner 1972). Governments consist of multiple agencies, and the question is which bureaucracies will matter and when. The brief answer offered here is that a bureaucracy's influence varies with its organizational salience, which consists of at least three dimensions: (1) the extent to which it has monopoly power on expertise, (2) the complexity of the issue, and (3) the period available for action. First, when one organization has all the expertise and no competitors, there is less pressure to change, and organizational biases are not checked. Second, the intricacy of an issue affects the degree to which specialist knowledge is required for decisions. The more complex the issue, the less senior authorities can oversee the operations, and the more organizational preferences will be felt. Third, the time frame for decision making can also have an effect. When decision-making cycles are short, there is little time for adjusting prearranged menus. They must be cooked and dished out as planned. All these traits suggest that the military will have a high salience in choices on the use of force in war. Militaries are key players in such situations because they generally have a monopoly on expertise, military operations are complex and not easily understood by nonspecialists, and the time for altering prearranged plans is limited. Although civilians may have authority to make final choices, often contrary to their wishes and intervention, military preferences can prevail in the midst of war due to the organizational salience of the armed forces. This view of when military organizations matter is in direct contrast to the dominant thinking on this issue, which posits that when threats to the state are significant, civilian leaders will intervene to correct the organizational biases of the armed forces (see Posen 1984) .
In sum, organizational culture is important because it shapes organizational identity, priorities, perception, and capabilities in ways unexpected by noncultural approaches. Those means compatible with the dominant war-fighting culture will be developed and advocated by the military, those that are not will suffer neglect.17 Especially in war, military orientations can affect national preferences because of increased organizational salience. Thus, even as the cultural tendencies of subnational organizations remain fairly consistent, their heightened influence in war may lead to change in national preferences (if such preferences are not compatible with culture). Because cultures are embedded in particular military services, we should expect national preferences to vary across issues areas and over time according to the culture and organizational salience of the relevant service. For realists, situation does not refer to class structure, international norms, or the domestic political aims of politicians but to opportunities for relative advantage based on the international distribution of capabilities among states. Most generally, realism has explained cooperation through balance-of-power theory, which asserts that the tendency of nations toward conflict is only contained by the penalties (such as monetary or physical) that might be incurred by taking on a stronger opponent or coalition. In this view, the primary incentive for states to cooperate is to counter, or "balance" against, a state aspiring to hegemony (Waltz 1979 ). Realism's logic is, however, applicable to other issues and forms of cooperation than simply the macro-machinations of alliances (Glaser 1994 
ASSESSING THE PROPOSITIONS
Cooperation in war is the product of two or more states opting for restraint. To understand their choices, the The dependent variable, outcome, refers to the preferences states had for cooperation (or noncooperation) when facing boundaries on the use of force that were recognized as such by the involved parties. This is assessed by the internal discussions of the wartime leadership regarding its preferred outcome. Although these decision-making bodies were not a unitary actor, they were often small groups that debated and generally reached consensus on desired ends. There is every reason to believe these discussions reflect actual preferences. This means that the preferences identified are not simply "revealed" by behavior but, instead, can be assessed independently.22 In practice, there was a relatively close correspondence between preferences and action except in those cases in which states preferred mutual restraint but switched to use in response to the 22 The exception here is the Soviet case; due to gaps in the evidence available on internal discussions, I rely to a certain degree on revealed preferences. 
An Overview
The aggregate findings are presented in the form of 2 x 2 panels collectively displayed in Figure 1 . The place- which countries preferred restraint but escalated in response to the other side's use were coded as RESTRAINT.
To the extent a particular perspective provides a good account of decisions, the cases line up in the northwest (USE-USE)
and southeast (RESTRAINT-RESTRAINT) boxes. This implies that a theory would expect a national preference for escalation, and escalation was indeed preferred. Similarly, restraint is predicted, and the outcome was indeed restraint. In most cases, the ultimate strategy choices of states mirrored their preferences. A comparison of the two panels in Figure 1 indicates the explanatory power of organizational culture in these cases. In almost every area, organizational beliefs and desires became national policy. In contrast, the predictions of realism are much more uneven. Often when states were in a position to gain relative advantage by escalating, they favored restraint. Likewise, when nations faced relative losses if escalation occurred, they led the way across the Rubicon.
Case Briefs
A short summary of how the two propositions relate to the outcomes in each case gives depth to the tables. The summaries are not meant to be definitive, and all the issues involved cannot be fully addressed, but they provide at least a flavor of the analysis. German Submarine Warfare. German preferences for restraint at the beginning of the war quickly shifted to use in the first six weeks. Realism would predict restraint in this situation. Hitler prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare because one of his top strategic priorities was not to provoke Britain and other countries, such as the United States, into a conflict he hoped could be avoided. Unrestricted U-boat attacks in World War I had brought the United States into the war, a change in the balance of power that led to Germany's defeat. Submarine warfare did offer tactical military advantages against Britain, which was dependent on sea trade, but Germany had only 26 ocean-going U-boats. Karl Donitz, commander of the force, argued that 300 would be needed for decisive results. Nonetheless, against the advice of the Foreign Ministry, which argued that escalation was strategically irrational, Germany turned to unrestricted submarine warfare before a decision had been reached on whether Britain could be placated.26
This switch is fully anticipated by organizational culture. In the German Navy the U-boat force held a respected position and legacy quite different from that of submarine forces in other countries (e.g., Britain and the United States). Furthermore, this force was distinguished by a collective belief in the utility of unrestricted warfare on commerce. Driven by this culture, naval officials promoted a skewed calculation of the relative tactical naval advantage to be derived through unrestricted submarine warfare. Because of the Navy's monopoly role in terms of agenda setting, evaluation, and implementation in sea warfare, organizational information and advice convinced Hitler to authorize unrestricted submarine warfare (despite the insufficient military results expected), thus displacing the political aim of not antagonizing Britain. British Submarine Warfare. In World War II, Britain desired limitations on submarine warfare, an outcome anticipated by both realism and organizational culture. Realism expects a preference for restraint in this case because Britain was an island nation and more vulnerable to such warfare than Germany. Organizational culture also expects restraint. The British Navy was dominated by an ethos that considered the battleship the pivotal element in the large clashes of fleets which were expected to decide war at sea. The submarine was seen as a strictly ancillary tool, and warfare on commerce, especially the unrestricted type, was paid little heed. The influence of organizational culture vis-A-vis realism in this case, however, is evident in several situations in which submarine warfare was ignored even though strategic circumstances indicated it would be more efficient than battleship combat. In the interwar period, when Japan-also an island nation vulnerable to a submarine campaign aimed at commerce-was judged 128 Britain's most likely naval foe, the Royal Navy never seriously considered unrestricted underwater warfare, even though its battleships were inadequate for protecting British interests in the Pacific. During the war, even after Germany had escalated, Britain maintained restraint in situations (e.g., Germany's iron-ore trade with Norway and Sweden and the Axis shipment of supplies across the Mediterranean) in which unrestricted warfare could have provided strategic gains. U.S. Submarine Warfare. Although mutual restraint in submarine warfare was preferred for most of the interwar period, U.S. preferences changed to favoring unrestricted submarine warfare on the first day of war. Realism persuasively explains this outcome. Japan, like Britain, was asymmetrically vulnerable to an unlimited campaign against its commerce. The United States would gain more than Japan by abandoning cooperation. Realism's emphasis on external circumstances nicely captures the switch in U.S. preferences on the day Japan initiated war with its Pearl Harbor attack.
In contrast, an organizational culture approach would expect restraint. The U.S. Navy, like the Royal Navy, was "battleship-bound" in its thinking during the interwar period. It gave little thought to unrestricted submarine warfare on commerce against Japan, the main expected opponent, despite Japan's vulnerability. The reason culture gave way in this case appears to be tied to the effect of the Pearl Harbor attack on the viability of the battleship culture. With a large portion of the U.S. battleship fleet already sent to the Atlantic to deal with the European war, the Japanese assault destroyed much of the remaining Pacific fleet based in Hawaii. Without battleships, the battleship mentality could not be sustained. The result was a turn to one of the few options remaining-unrestricted submarine warfare. German Strategic Bombing. Germany's leaders discussed the possibility of attacking Britain's civilian population, but until Britain escalated in the spring and summer of 1940, they preferred mutual restraint. This desire, however, clashed with the strategic opportunities available to Germany. As both combatants believed, Britain was more vulnerable to unrestricted bombing than Germany due to its concentration of population and industry. In addition, Germany had superior strategic position for a bombing campaign after its invasion of France and the Low Countries. Hitler, of course, hoped that Britain would make peace at that time, but even after it was clear Britain would fight on, Germany maintained restraint.27 Why was Britain so willing to escalate the air war given its emphasis on avoiding unrestricted bombing and the acknowledged asymmetry in forces favoring Germany? Realism would focus on the German invasion of the Low Countries and France, confronting Britain with the possible collapse of its most important ally and destruction of the British Army forces on the continent. From this perspective, a change in external circumstances led to an adaptive change in preferences by Britain: The RAF was permitted to carry out the plans that civilians had overseen and approved in the prewar period-the strategic bombing of industrial targets-to confront the invasion. But this argument ignores three key dynamics that do not fit realist logic: (1) the RAF's prewar strategy was not sensibly assessed against external circumstances as realism would expect (until too late in the interwar period); (2) a preference for escalation conflicted with strategic rationality in that Britain's 
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leaders believed RAF strategic bombing was not suited to fighting Germany and would have costs they considered extremely significant; and (3) Britain critically misinterpreted the external situation at that time by misinterpreting German strategy. All of these deviations from strategic rationality were central to preferences and are best understood as organizational culture effects.
First, while strategic bombing appeared to make sense to Britain as a complement to a naval blockade of Germany in overall strategy, the efficacy of such a plan was accepted uncritically for most of the interwar period. Its feasibility, until too late, was based on excessively optimistic assumptions, which were allowed to stand because they were culturally compatible. While the decision to bomb in May 1940 was consistent with the prewar "Western Air" (WA) plans, the plans themselves were produced by the RAF and therefore guided by its strategic bombing orthodoxy. Most of these options were ill-suited to one of the main expected conflict scenarios, namely, a German invasion across the western borders (Webster and Frankland 1961; Terraine 1985) . The failure to adapt plans to circumstances does not fit realist expectations.
Second, during the actual invasion, although the RAF argued for the utility of strategic bombing, British leaders were very hesitant to allow it because they wished to avoid the expected German counterescalation and also because many believed, including the British Army, the French allies, and Churchill himself, that strategic bombing would have little effect on the battlefield and that direct support of the armies was the needed response.33 But the RAF lacked the aircraft, skills, and plans to carry out the mission, and its limited efforts at ground support were unsuccessful (Terraine 1985; Tress 1988 ). Even in light of its limited options, however, Britain made a decision difficult to understand through strategic logic; escalation became the preferred outcome even though it implied significant costs (the dreaded counterattacks) with few benefits (i.e., escalation would not affect the German invasion or save the British Army in France).
Finally, some British leaders reasoned that there was no use in holding back because Germany was expected to escalate the air war anyway, and strategic attacks might relieve the pressure on the battlefield by provoking assaults on Britain. Both of these claims, however, were largely based on the British assumption that the Luftwaffe had a doctrine of strategic bombing similar to that of the RAF (Terraine 1985 ). This was not accurate. While the German air force did pay attention to strategic bombing, as Murray (1985) has highlighted, it did not dominate the Luftwaffe's thinking as it did in the RAF. German air planning and operations consistently listed the hierarchy of aims as (1) destruction of enemy air power, (2) support of the Army and Navy, and (3) tasks which might be considered strategic bombing. In the 1930s, the Luftwaffe successively shifted closer to a land campaign support role, and it had insufficient capabilities and plans for the type of strategic air offensive that Britain expected.34 Thus, the events of spring 1940 raise two questions. Why were the options of British leaders so limited, and why were German air strategy and capabilities so misunderstood?
As suggested above, an important part of the answer to these questions can be found in the organizational culture of the RAF. Virtually from the end of World War I, the RAF was founded and developed according to a philosophy of offensive strategic bombing. The central tenets of this philosophy were that the best way either to prevent or to win a war would be to launch a massive assault on the enemy's sources of power. This included both depriving the enemy of the physical means to fight and breaking its morale to continue the battle. The RAF's culture shaped its development. Perhaps this was most evident in the capabilities it acquired. The airmen focused their efforts on planes and equipment designed to support the independent strategic bomber offensive, such as heavy bombers ill-suited for either supporting the Army or precision bombing. Little attention was given to instruments used in close air support or precision attacks. Maneuvers that indicated the "relative impotence rather than power of bombing" were given short shrift.36 Strategic bombing plans remained the touchstone of RAF thinking.37 Little attention was paid to tactical support. After a 1939 exercise, one air officer noted that pilots were incapable of carrying out a mission supporting ground forces (Murray 1980, 48) . Another area of cultural influence was threat analysis. The RAF tended to attribute to Germany the same bomber-offensive doctrine it held and then use that view to support its own doctrine (Wark 1985 determinants of strategic policy. For most of the interwar period, the RAF's outlook was largely shaped and developed according to Trenchard's philosophy of strategic offensive bombing. Yet, in 1937, a civilian committee led by Thomas Inskip intervened to impose a fighterbased defense scheme on the RAF. The committee believed that Britain's vulnerability and inferior air power, in light of the growing threat of war (and the cost of the bomber offensive) made a defensive scheme an absolute necessity. RAF policy was apparently turned on its head by civilian dominance (Posen 1984) . If the story stopped here, it would certainly illustrate the power of realist over organizational culture factors. But it continues. Within a year of the outbreak of war, the type of unrestricted bomber offensive that Trenchard had envisioned twenty years earlier was implemented. This occurred despite the fact that the external conditions which had prompted increased attention to the defensive scheme in the first place persisted. Britain still perceived itself as extremely vulnerable to air attack and vastly inferior to Germany in air power.
RAF culture, in fact, had not dramatically changed. Development of bomber offensive capabilities was not as rapid as it might have been otherwise, but the strategy was not displaced. In fact, what did not happen is, again, just as telling as what did. The RAF did not shift to an overall fighter-dominated scheme that extended the massive air defense umbrella, used to defend Britain, across the channel to protect the Allied forces on the Continent. Nor did the RAF move to a different type of offensive posture, such as the battlefield-support strategy that emerged in Germany. Instead, the bomber offensive remained the central orthodoxy.
Why did the RAF's culture carry less sway on national choices (i.e., the turn to fighter defenses) in peace yet have a large influence on preferences in war? Here, the concept of organizational salience is insightful. While the military remains the exclusive expert in both peace and war, its influence is more significant during combat, when military affairs (and not, for example, budgets) are the main national concern. In such situations, soldiers often have a say in the highest level decisions of state, and this was true in Britain. In addition, during peace there is often more time to make decisions and change culturally biased plans (even if there is less incentive to do so from a strategic viewpoint, as Posen [1984] notes). Whereas British leaders could to a certain extent redirect resources to fighter command in 1937, there was no way to create a ground attack force instantly in 1940 to take on the German onslaught. Thus, due to the variation in organizational salience, civilian desires were more influential in 1937 than in 1940.
In this case, realism helps explain both Britain's turn to air defense and its restraint in strategic bombing in the first eight months of the war by focusing on Britain's expectation of relative disadvantage from all-out strategic bombing. But realism cannot explain why Britain escalated in 1940 when the same asymmetry in forces still prevailed. This decision makes most sense from an organizational culture perspective on Britain's strategic 132 choices.38 RAF culture, emphasizing victory through independent air operations intended to break the enemy's will-power, deemed escalation desirable. The strategic bombing mind-set biased evaluations of effective strategy, expectations of enemy actions, and the capabilities, skills, and plans Britain had available. Thus, when it came time to call the RAF into action, escalation was hard to avoid. Germany's invasion of France coincided with escalation, but it cannot be seen as the main cause of it. In this case, Britain's launching of the unrestricted strategic bomber offensive was more a matter of timing than relative-advantage choice.
IMPLICATIONS
Useful directions for research in the study of international relations are suggested in three areas: preference formation in cooperation, the sources of foreign policy preferences, and the role of culture in political analysis. Regarding the first, the importance of preference formation and change to cooperation is underscored by the events of World War II. To argue that preferences matter is hardly controversial, but to suggest the appropriateness of focusing on preferences sets my argument apart from two major schools in the study of international relations. One is the predominant extant work on international cooperation that concentrates on interaction. Such analyses have produced significant insights into why and when states collaborate, but their silence on preference dynamics needs to be addressed. Of course, the import of taking preferences as given depends on the theory or model and the purposes for which it is constructed. For example, assuming preferences in formal models that aim to illuminate the logic of interaction rather than empirically test that logic has provided important results, as demonstrated in such work as Robert Powell's (e.g., 1990, 1991). Not surprisingly, Powell suggests that, rather than focus on assumptions about preferences, "careful specifications of the constraints that define the strategic environment will prove the more fruitful and insightful course in future debates" (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993, 737) .
The strategic environment, however, cannot be considered the whole story of actual instances of cooperation. To compliment Powell's course, a parallel track is needed that does not debate assumptions over, but pays theoretical and empirical attention to, preferences. Again, I am not suggesting that the differences in use of the three types of warfare is one of "autonomous" preferences: Interaction, as the cooperation two-step suggests, was also critical as seen in the reciprocity of Britain's unrestricted submarine warfare and Germany's unlimited strategic bombing. The broader implication is 38 This case alone does not allow the differentiation of an organizational culture explanation from that of traditional organization theory because both predict use. Where the cultural element is clear, however, is in comparison with Germany. The Luftwaffe had a similar structure and incentives for autonomy, resources, etc. Yet, its air culture was more closely linked to the land campaign that was compatible with restraint. Militaries do not generically favor escalation, as traditional theory expects; the beliefs that characterize similar bureaucracies lead to different orientations on restraint and escalation. that there is a need to move beyond static coordination, prisoner's dilemma, or zero-sum games to a richer variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical situations-and most importantly, a consideration of when and why such ''games'' change.
My argument is also distinct from the second major school, which suggests that we need to concentrate our efforts on the construction of the identities of states (Bloom 1990 ; Katzenstein n.d.; Nau 1993; Wendt 1992 Wendt , 1994 . Certainly, how states see themselves and their roles can affect both their preferences and actions. Nonetheless, the identities and basic interests of states can remain constant for long periods. Thus, a focus on preferences is useful for exploring why state desires in different issue areas change even as their basic identities remain relatively stable. In short, cooperation in World War II indicates that interaction and identity dynamics must be supplemented by a better understanding of preference formation and change. This requires addressing such issues as the stability of preferences, the sources of preferences, and different ways to think about preferences and interaction that fill in and go beyond the cooperation "two-step. "39 Preference formation is a complex topic, and making sense of the many possible sources of national desires requires alternative approaches and empirical research. This essay has highlighted organizational culture, which shaped preferences in several areas. One is state interpretations of the international situation. The internal beliefs of military organizations molded the way that states understood situations and how they viewed the desirability of different outcomes. Such views were not simply derivative of international conditions. In many instances, cultural preference conflicted with what realism would expect given the external situation.40 For example, Britain's air strategy calculations were based on culturally driven conclusions about German strategy and bombing effectiveness that did not match the available evidence. Realists might argue that these deviations simply represent random miscalculation or a failure to grasp accurately the logic of the prevailing balance. But when such behavior is regular across a range of cases ideally suited to realism's logic, such a response holds little water.
Culture also determined the response repertoire available to states. The preparations militaries made in peacetime had a decisive effect on the choices nations made in war. Leaders often faced an option funnel, that is, the variety of policy possibilities was actually limited to the central plan in which organizations had invested themselves. The weapons, plans, and skills developed according to cultural penchant often decided what national leaders would do even before they considered a 39 Ironically, both constructivists and strategic interaction analysts face a similar challenge-how to conceptualize and validate models where preferences are endogenous to intervention while avoiding analytic pitfalls. For examples of each see Finnemore (n.d.) and Oye (1992) . 40 While international circumstances did sometimes play a role in the formation of culture (as in the U.S. submarine case), they were not the only formative source. Furthermore, even when international circumstances changed, and the costs of adaptation were not prohibitive, cultures tended to endure. situation. For example, Britain turned to strategic bombing in May 1940 when leaders would have preferred a restricted battlefield support air strategy, but the RAF lacked capabilities for such a mission. This culturecapabilities connection, of course, does not always determine outcomes. The U.S. Navy, after all, shifted rapidly to an unrestricted submarine campaign that it hardly considered during the interwar period. As one commentator has noted, however, it was an "accident of history" that the existing U.S. submarine force could be used for such a strategy-and about one-third of the captains who had trained under the battleship orthodoxy had to be replaced because they simply could not adjust to the new way of thinking (Blair 1975; Rosen 1991) .
Another display of organizational influence was in the relative civilian/military imprint on preferences. Realism expects military counsel to be offered but political leaders, unaffected by bureaucratic culture and pressured by imminent threats, should ultimately favor options in line with objective strategic needs (Posen 1984 While organizational culture provides the better overall explanation of the cooperation examined here, realism also offers insights. As it anticipates, leaders set goals, weighed alternative, courses of action, and calculated whether benefits outweighed costs. In making choices, ends and means, -as they were understood, were often efficiently joined as states sought out relative advantage. At issue is what was considered as an option, what defined costs and benefits, what means were available for implementing choices, and what standard was used in learning from past action or experience. On these crucial issues, states appeared to take their cues more from the internal interpretive world of culture than from the conditions of the external environment, such as the balance of power. This, however, need not always be the case. Depending on the organizational salience of militaries, culture's role may be less. And when cultural orientation clashes dramatically with material feasibility, cultures are more likely to adapt, as in the case of U.S. submarine warfare.
These findings add to the growing body of research that questions the top-down orthodoxy of international relations theory since World War II. Explanations of state security strategies have reflected a significant, probably dominant, concern with systemic determinants that are "outside" states. Many theorists give priority to international constraints, believing that these do the lion's share of explanation, and only move on to other levels to clear up the details that cannot be explained systemically. Deterrence theorists focus on the balance of power and resolve. Regime theorists emphasize systemic agreements and norms. Constructivists point to systemic social interaction. The organizational culture approach, however, suggests that structures and cultures internal to states can be just as constraining, that bottom-up approaches at times can carry the bulk of explanation. Thus, those concerned with whether deterrence succeeds or fails, whether international agreements will be sustained, and whether systemic collective meanings will endure may need to reconsider the way that societal and subsocietal collective beliefs and habits guide the orientation of state knowledge, preferences, and choices undergirding international phenomena.
The challenge of how to weight the relative importance of internal and external approaches is once again apparent. Traditionally, in security affairs and decisions on the use of military force that affect national survival, systemic approaches (particularly realism) have been given pride of place. In contrast, in economic policy, analysts often view domestic interest groups, classes, and sectors as more central. Clearly, the findings here transcend such a division. Furthermore, organizational culture is not only relevant to military bureaucracies or security issues. Although organizational cultures have received relatively little attention in the study of economic policy, some work suggests that they can be important in that area as well (Bachman 1991; Johnson 1982) .
The explanatory ability of organizational culture in these cases, however, should not suggest that either culture, organizational influence, or some combination thereof is the most important "domestic" source of preferences. Nor should it suggest that domestic explanations are always, or even usually, more powerful than international systemic ones. The conditions under which the forces in one arena matter more than another, or how the two interact, are clearly an open question. The common refrain that synthetic domestic-international approaches are needed certainly is true. One response to this gap has been the development of the two-level game approach (Evans 1993; Putnam 1988) . While this perspective has offered new insights, it replicates the posited preference bias noted above, which assumes actor desires; the innovation is to add different arenas in which state actors strategically attempt to maximize their utility.42 Explanations are also necessary to account for the preference and knowledge structures that undergird interaction.
Culture is one important conceptual vehicle for addressing this gap. In international relations theory, culture has generally been poorly applied (Johnston 1995a) or simply relegated to analytical backwaters as a "soft" variable that can only explain marginal residual variance.43 Yet, in the "hard" issue area of security affairs and armed conflict, we have seen that one form of culture was quite potent in shaping outcomes. The influence of organizational culture in World War II suggests the applicability of culture for other theories that focus narrowly on "formal" structure-such as the distribution of international capabilities, the political structures of states, or the flow chart of organizationsand ignore the "informal" structure of collective beliefs and customs. Formal structure is often inadequate for understanding preferences and behavior. This is true for structural approaches related both to external international position (realism) and internal bureaucratic arrangement (structural organization theory). Structural organization theory, for example, asserts that similar formal structures should have similar preferences and act in a similar manner. Yet, military advocacy of escalation in World War II, as the traditional model expects, was not a uniform response. Organizations favored restraint in certain areas and not in others. These different orientations are best explained by referring to the collective beliefs and customs that characterized and directed the different military services, rather than some generic tendency shared by all military organizations.
Several prominent approaches to international relations based on formal structure might benefit from paying attention to the informal structure of culture. Much of the work on democracies, for example, posits that "republican" regimes will have similar preferences and behavior due to common constitutional structures; e.g., democracies (generically) are less prone to fight one another. A cultural view would suggest that within similar democratic regimes different hierarchies of beliefs can take shape which can lead to different (1) internal norms on cooperation and compromise, (2) perceptions about how others' norms are different from one's own, and, ultimately, (3) external behavior.44 For example, a topic worthy of attention is whether norms on cooperation and compromise are really the same in democracies such as the United States, Japan, and Russia and whether officials in those countries perceive them to be the same. A cultural approach suggests caution in assuming that policies of countries need be similar because they have a common political regime type.45 At the international level, many explanations generally assume that similar power structures will lead to similar behavior. For example, hegemonic stability theory posits that hegemons will seek an open trading system. The cultural analysis posited here, however, would expect different types of behavior depending on the beliefs and customs that differentiate hegemons. As Ruggie (1982) has noted, despite the similar power structure of Dutch, British, and U.S. hegemony, the nature of the respective international systems differs due to the different collective beliefs that defined the purposes of the hegemons.
My argument is not that structure is unimportant, while culture clears up all puzzles. Rather, it is the combination of culture and structure that matters. Cul-ture's key contribution is to explain how differences in the collective beliefs and norms that characterize structures can lead to different understandings and behavior even while formal structure is similar. Nonetheless, certain measures of formal structural design may be necessary to account for why some cultures are more uniform and influential. As discussed above, the influence of bureaucratic cultures on national policy will vary with their organizational salience. For example, organizations with a functional monopoly (a formal structural trait) are more likely to shape policy than when multiple points of view are available to policymakers. In World War II, the military's organizational monopoly meant that, with no competitors in expertise, military preferences played a large role in decisions on the use of force in terms of advice as well as the types of plans and capabilities developed. Likewise, in other areas in which bureaucracies or societal groups have similar salience, the collective beliefs that characterize them as an entity may be influential. The fact that culture was significant in circumstances of armed conflict, in which material capabilities and strategic action are so critical, suggests that it may be even more relevant in other international relations issues.
